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Relativism concerning truth (hereafter ‘Truth-Relativism’) has been applied to a diverse range of expressions including predicates of personal taste, future contingents, epistemic modals, vague predicates, and a range of epistemic locutions.​[1]​ Despite the considerable promise of Truth-Relativism to illuminate the use of such expressions, the following pressing challenge besets the view: how can we make sense of assertion if truth is relative?
On a common view, an assertion that p is correct only if p is true.​[2]​ But how can we specify the norm of assertion in terms of truth, if truth is relative? Equally, on another view, an assertion that p by s is correct only if s knows that p.​[3]​ Given Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’ then whether a subject knows that p is a relative matter. But how can the norm of assertion be specified if knowledge is relative? More generally, it is a truism that, in asserting, we aim to make assertions which are correct (if our assertions are sincere). If correctness is relative to a perspective, it seems senseless to speak of such an aim. We can put the problem thus: the goal of assertion is to hit some target (truth or knowledge, say). But if truth or knowledge are relative matters then there is no single privileged target to aim at. So, what is the aim of assertion? 
	Evans (1985) effectively works this worry up into the following challenge:

If a theory of reference permits a subject to deduce that a particular utterance is now correct, but later will be incorrect, it cannot assist the subject in deciding what to say, nor in interpreting the remarks of others. What should he aim at, or take others to be aiming at? Maximum correctness? But of course, if he knew an answer to this question, it would necessarily generate a once-and-for-all assessment of utterances, according to whether or not they meet whatever condition the answer gave (Evans 1985, pp. 349-50).

From this we can extract the following argument:​[4]​

(1) The question ‘What should he aim at?’ is a legitimate question.
(2) Any legitimate answer to this question will generate a once-and-for-all answer.
(3) Any once-and-for-all answer is incompatible with Truth-Relativism.
(4) Therefore, Truth-Relativism is ruled out.

Which accounts of assertion are compatible with Truth-Relativism? Which can properly answer Evans' challenge? Which can properly explain all the linguistic data—and particularly the data for ‘knows’? Are there alternative forms of relativism which can do better? These are the questions which will preoccupy us below.





The main goals in this paper are: (1) To sketch three ‘shifty’ models for ‘knows’: Indexical Contextualism, Non-Indexical Contextualism, and Truth-Relativism. (2) To display the canonical template for the variability data for ‘knows’. (3) To show that the lottery data fails to fit this template and is not genuine data, contra Vogel (1990), Lewis (1996), Hawthorne (2004). (4) To show that Kölbel’s account: (a) cannot accommodate the basic variability data, (b) cannot answer Evans' challenge, (c) and cannot accommodate what I term the re-evaluation data. (5) To show that: (a) MacFarlane’s account suffers from an over-intellectualisation objection, (b) MacFarlane is too hasty to reject a goal-based account of assertion, (c) MacFarlane’s account can only handle the variability data for beliefs by collapsing into something like the knowledge account of assertion. (6) To show how a (relativistic) knowledge norm for both assertion and belief can make better sense of the linguistic data. (7) To outline and defend an alternative view—Norm-Relativism—whereby just what norm of assertion and belief is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective.
 

3. Indexical and Non-Indexical Contextualism for ‘knows’.

On a Kaplan-style semantics, the following schema fixes the conditions under which a sentence, relativised to a context of use, is true: 

(K) A sentence type S, as used in context of utterance c, is true absolutely just in case the proposition expressed by the use of S in c is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by c.​[8]​

A context of use fixes a world, speaker, time, location, and so on. Given contextualism for ‘knows’, a context of use also fixes the epistemic standards which determine just what strength of epistemic position is required for a subject to count as knowing. Standardly, a circumstance of evaluation is simply a world—in the default case, the world of the context of use.
The context of utterance plays two roles with respect to the determination of truth: firstly, together with the conventional meaning of the sentence S, it determines which proposition is expressed by the use of S; secondly, it fixes the circumstance of evaluation against which this proposition is evaluated.​[9]​
Indexical Contextualism for ‘knows’ is a conjunction of the following theses: (i) ‘knows’ is some kind of an indexical.​[10]​ (ii) The epistemic standards are set by the context of use. (iii) The default circumstance of evaluation is the world of the context of use. (iv) The proposition expressed by a use of ‘s knows that p’ in a low-standards context (where the stakes are low and the possibility of error has not been raised) is: <s knows that p according to low standards>. (v) The proposition expressed by a use of ‘s knows that p’ in a high-standards context (where the possibility of error and/or the stakes have been raised) is: <s knows that p according to high standards>. (vi) The epistemic standards of the context of use play a content-determinative role. (vii) Given K, utterance truth is absolute.​[11]​
	While Indexical Contextualism builds the standards into the content expressed by a use of ‘s knows that p’, Non-Indexical Contextualism builds the standards into the circumstance of evaluation. Non-Indexical Contextualism is a conjunction of the following theses: (i) ‘know’ is semantically sensitive to the standards at the context of use, but is not an indexical. (ii) The epistemic standards are set by the context of use. (iii) The default circumstance of evaluation is the pair: the world of the context of use, the epistemic standards of the context of use. (iv) The proposition expressed by a use of ‘s knows that p’ in either high and low is the ‘standards-neutral’ proposition: <s knows that p>. (v) This proposition may be true relative to low but false relative to high epistemic standards. (vi) Given K, utterance truth is absolute.​[12]​ 






4. Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’.

On a genuinely relativistic conception, sentence type truth is relative not only to a context of use but a perspective—what MacFarlane (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) calls a ‘context of assessment’. Loosely, a perspective is the viewpoint of some possible subject who assesses a proposition for truth. More formally, a perspective, like a context of use, fixes a world, a subject, a time, a location, and so on. Given Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’, a perspective also determines the epistemic standards, where, again, these standards fix just what strength of epistemic position is required for a subject to count as knowing. There is no metaphysically or semantically privileged perspective—the standards that obtain at the context of use are not the default standards against which we evaluate a proposition.
We can modify K so as to allow for Truth-Relativism as follows: 

(R) A sentence type S, as used in a context of use c, is true, relative to a context of assessment a, just in case the proposition expressed by the use of S in c is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both the context of use c and the context of assessment a.​[13]​

The circumstance-determinative role is now divided up between the context of use and the context of assessment: the context of use determines the world of evaluation, the context of assessment determines the (epistemic) standards. 
	Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’ is a conjunction of the following theses: (i) ‘knows’ is not use-sensitive but is rather ‘assessment-sensitive’. (ii) The epistemic standards are set by the context of assessment. (iii) The default circumstance of evaluation is the pair: world of the context of use, the epistemic standards of the context of assessment. (iv) The proposition expressed by a use of ‘s knows that p’ in any context is the ‘standards-neutral’ proposition <s knows that p>. (v) This proposition may be true relative to low-standards but false relative to high-standards. (vi) Given R, utterance truth is relative.​[14]​
	The disquotational schema for utterance truth is compatible with R. When I evaluate your utterance, made in a low-standards context, of ‘s knows that p’, I evaluate what you said as false—since I am in a high-standards context. Moreover, given R, I also evaluate your utterance as false.   




5. The epistemic variability data and the canonical template.

The epistemic variability data most naturally comes in the form of a dialogue. Consider the following dialogue concerning the ‘Car-parking Case’ (see Vogel 1990):

A says: I know that my car is parked outside.
B says: Perhaps the car thieves are in the Neighbourhood.
A says: Now that you mention it, I guess I don’t know that my car is parked outside after all.​[15]​

Here B raises the possibility of error (or perhaps raises the stakes or both). A, let us say, then performs the following reasoning: ‘I can’t rule out the possibility that my car has been stolen and taken away, therefore I don’t know that my car is parked outside’.
	To simplify, assume a first-person case whereby the context of assessment coincides with the context of use; and assume that the subject is also the assessor/speaker. The canonical template for the epistemic variability data is:
 
(i) c is a low-standards context of utterance (where the stakes are low and the possibility of error has not been raised.)
(ii) c' is a high-standards context of utterance (where the stakes are high and/or the possibility of error has been raised).
(iii) In context c, my assertion, of ‘I know that p’ seems to be correct.
(iv) In context c', my assertion of ‘I know that p’ does not seem to be correct.
(v) In context c', my assertion of ‘I do not know that p’ seems to be correct.
(vi) My strength of epistemic position does not differ between c and c'.​[16]​

This veracity of this data might (readily) be doubted. One might accept (iv) but doubt (v), for example. For the purposes of this paper, I will not question the data.


6.	Lottery cases and Gettier cases.

Do any Gettier cases fit the template just given? Surely not.​[17]​ But given that lottery cases are broadly analogous to a certain kind of Gettier case, specifically barn-façade cases, then lottery cases should also fail to fit the template. But Vogel (1990), Lewis (1996), Hawthorne (2002, 2004) think that lottery cases do exhibit the relevant kind of shiftiness. This cannot be right. Take the sentence: ‘I know that John will never be rich’, where John is some poor friend of mine, from a very poor country, who is constitutionally incapable of improving his financial lot. Imagine the following dialogue (which is supposed to exhibit the relevant shiftiness):

I say: I know that John will never be rich.														(context c)
You say: Really! He has just bought a ticket to the lottery. He might win.				(context c')
I say: I guess I don’t know that John will never be rich.										(context c')

But clause (vi) of the canonical template is not met. Some evidentially relevant piece of information that has not been specified in context c (namely that John has bought a ticket to a lottery) which is specified in c'. Absent this information, we are inclined to assert that we know that John will never be rich (given what we know about John and his environment). With this information, we are inclined to assert that we do not know that John will never be rich. Imagine if I set up a barn-façade case (for a speaker who has never come across the case before) by withholding some evidentially relevant piece of information (such that there are fake barns in the environment of Henry) and then I inform the speaker of this extra piece of information. The corresponding dialogue is then as follows:

A says: Henry knows that’s a barn. 										(context c)
I say: Really! But Henry is surrounded by barn-facades. 			(context c')
A says: I guess Henry doesn’t know that is a barn.						(context c')

But what explains the shift in ascription between c and c' is simply the furnishing of the evidentially relevant piece of information that Henry is surrounded by fake barns. 
In general, where the evidentially relevant feature of the case has not been made explicit in some context then we are is in no position to ascribe knowledge (or ignorance) to the subject until this piece of information has been made explicit—otherwise we should be allowed to say that Henry does know that he is looking at a real barn even though there are many fake barns in his environment. 
So, lottery cases are akin to a certain kind of Gettier case. Both such cases do not exhibit the kind of shiftiness which supports a ‘shifty’ view for ‘knows’.​[18]​ Does this carry over to car-parking cases, bank cases, airport cases, and sceptical cases? The main theme of Hawthorne (2002, 2004) is that the lottery cases generalise such that car-parking cases are analogous to lottery cases. Here is what Hawthorne says:

Lotteries present a puzzle to non-sceptics. If I do not know that I will win a lottery, I do not know either, say, whether I will be someone who has a surprise fatal heart attack, or whether I will be the unlucky victim of theft and so on. But if I do not know such things, then apparently humdrum knowledge of the future—that I will be teaching next week, that I will be driving to work in my own car, and so on—is threatened (Hawthorne 2002, p. 244).

The open future presents a special case of scepticism which I will not consider here.​[19]​ However, lottery cases, for both Vogel and Hawthorne, are supposed to generalise to car-parking cases (and similar cases) even if the future is closed. We have the strong inclination to say that I do not know my ticket is a losing ticket even if the draw has already been made (and so where the objective probability of my ticket being a loser is 0 or 1).​[20]​ However, once we consider cases that do not involve the future tense, it looks there is a strong disanalogy between lottery cases and car-parking cases (and similar cases). In the drawn lottery case, I justifiably believe that the lottery is a fair lottery. So, I have strong evidence that it is an easy possibility that my ticket is a losing ticket. In the car-parking case, I don’t have any evidence that it is an easy-possibility that my car has been stolen and taken away. Rather, I have simply have the statistical evidence that, for example, one out of every ten thousand cars in my city is stolen everyday. But that evidence is compatible with it not being an easy possibility that my car has been stolen and taken away. The car thieves may be working in an entirely different neighbourhood right now, such that, as things stand, it is not an easy possibility right now for my car to be stolen by them—right now the world is epistemically cooperative with respect to my claim that I know that my car is parked outside. So, I am in a position to know that my car is parked outside despite the ‘chance’ that the car thieves have stolen it and taken it away.​[21]​ I am not in a position to know that my ticket is a losing ticket.
The lottery proposition <my ticket is a losing ticket> is not known to be true in both and low and high standards contexts. Likewise, for the proposition <I know that I will never be rich> (at least if I have bought a ticket to a fair lottery). The proposition <my car has not been stolen and taken away> is not analogous to a lottery proposition since, as has just been argued, one can know this proposition to be true despite the ‘chance’ of car thieves in the area. The question remains: is this proposition known to be true merely in low-standards contexts or can it be known to be true in high-standards contexts also? Likewise for the proposition <I know that my car is parked outside>. (See §23-24 below for some relevant discussion.) 


7.	Relativism and the truth norm for assertion: take one.

It is common to hold that truth is the aim of assertion.​[22]​ However, this slogan is ambiguous. It gives rise to two distinct norms: (1) The ‘success’ norm which, as an injunction, says: in asserting, speak the truth. (2) The ‘aim’ norm which, as an injunction, says: in asserting, aim to speak the truth. These often get confused (see below), but clearly one may satisfy one without satisfying the other. In asserting, I may hit the truth, but without aiming to do so. Equally, in asserting, I may aim to hit the truth but fail to hit the truth. 
Can one simply derive the aim norm from the success norm such that if C is the condition of correctness for the success norm then in asserting one should aim to make assertions which meet condition C?​[23]​ That’s too quick. The connection seems to be more complex. Given that conditions for correct assertion are typically less than ideal it ought to be that if C is the condition of correctness for the success norm then in asserting one should aim to make assertions which meet some condition which is stronger than condition C. So, suppose truth is the success norm, then the aim norm should be, for example, that in asserting, one should aim at knowledge and not mere truth. Metaphorically, if one wants to hit the target (truth, say), under less than ideal epistemic conditions, then one should aim at the centre of the target (knowledge, say)—that way, one will hit the target more often.
	It remains in any case somewhat obscure what it is to aim at truth. Difficult questions include: Can one aim at truth without trying? Does one need evidence in order to aim at the truth? The success norm is less obscure.​[24]​ On the truth account, it tells us that an assertion is correct only if the asserted content is true. Evans' challenge now has two formulations. One involves the (aim-related) question which Evans in fact poses: ‘What should he aim at?’. The other involves the (success-related) question: ‘When has he made a correct/incorrect assertion?’ In answer to the former, Evans says: ‘In fact we know what he should do; he should utter sentence types true at the time [and, more generally, context] of utterance’. But this provides an answer to the second question, not the first. An answer to the first is: ‘he should aim to utter sentence types true at the context of utterance’. So, Evans confuses the two types of norm.
Which formulation of the puzzle did Evans intend? Which formulation of the puzzle is central? Since what it is to aim at truth is somewhat obscure, and since Evans provides an answer to the second question, I suggest that more interesting formulation of the puzzle involves the success-related question.
Kölbel (2003, pp. 67-71) holds that it is a mistake for one to assert a proposition that is not true in one’s own perspective. Suppose, for time being, that truth is also sufficient for correctness. This yields: 

(AT1) An assertion of the sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct if and only if the proposition expressed by the use of S in c is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by c.

One strategy which uses the epistemic variability data to establish a shifty account of ‘knows’ using AT1 is: (a) Assume that the data expresses genuine correctness conditions for assertion (and not some mere non-epistemic propriety conditions). (b) Assume, putting scepticism aside, that the sentence ‘I know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c, is true. (c) Use data point (iv) from the epistemic variability template given above and the right-to-left direction of AT1 to show that the sentence ‘I know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is not true. (d) Use data point (v), and the left-to-right direction of AT1 to show that the sentence ‘I do not know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is true.​[25]​ Thus, there is a difference in the truth-value of ‘I know that my car is parked outside’ relative to low and high-standards contexts.
As it turns out, on this strategy, step (c) is redundant. Thus, if one doubts that truth is sufficient for correct assertion that does not matter. If, however, one doubts the data point (v) then the sufficiency of truth for correct assertion is essential. But the right-to-left direction of AT1 might be doubted: I assert that the number of molecules in my wine glass is some number n. I just happen to be right by accident. Nonetheless, according to AT1, my assertion was correct. But that is surely implausible. So, it had better be that data point (v) is a genuine data point if the data is to support a shifty view for ‘knows’.




8.	Problem one: Evans' challenge.

As we have seen, Kölbel holds that it is a mistake for one to assert a proposition that is not true in one’s own perspective. But does this answer Evans' challenge? Just like Evans' own reply, the answer yields a once-and-for-all assessment of correctness. AT1 tells us to check the standards that are in play in the asserter’s context. Suppose the asserter has uttered a proposition that is untrue by those standards. His assertion is thus incorrect—and moreover absolutely so. So, AT1, and so Kölbel’s dictum, are merely compatible with Non-Indexical Contextualism rather than Truth-Relativism proper.


9.	Problem two: the epistemic re-evaluation data.

A crucial motivation for Truth-Relativism is that contextualist views cannot account for what I shall term the re-evaluation data.​[26]​ The following represents the canonical template for the epistemic re-evaluation data (where, as before, c is a low-standards context and c' is a high-standards context):

(i) In context c, my assertion of ‘I know that p’ seems to be legitimate.  
(ii) In context c', it seems correct to re-evaluate my earlier assertion by saying: ‘it was incorrect to make that assertion’.
(iii) In context c', it also seems correct to (indirectly) re-evaluate my earlier assertion by saying: ‘It would have been correct back then to assert that I did not know that p’.	
(iv) My strength of epistemic position does not differ between c and c'.






10.	Relativism and the truth norm for assertion: take two. 
	
What is needed is:

(AT2) An assertion of the sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if the proposition expressed by a use of S in c is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both c and a.

(where c fixes the world of evaluation and a fixes the epistemic standards). Is AT2 able to meet Evans' challenge? There are three strategies the Truth-Relativist might adopt here—depending on how the challenge is read.
The first strategy is to reject the claim that ‘When has he made a correct/incorrect assertion?’ is a legitimate question since, on one reading of the challenge, this question already presupposes that any legitimate answer will be of the form: an assertion is correct/incorrect (absolutely) just in case such and such conditions obtain. (Kölbel’s answer as we have seen was of this form.) Any challenge to a view which already presupposes that the view is false is no challenge at all. There is thus no force to Evans' challenge whether or not you think Truth-Relativism is correct.
On an alternative reading, the question ‘When has he made a correct/incorrect assertion?’ does not presuppose that the answer must be of the form mentioned above, but rather challenges Truth-Relativism to provide any kind of guidance to the asserter. In the absence of such guidance, Truth-Relativism can hardly be said to have provided a norm at all. But if that is the challenge, then Truth-Relativism can still provide an answer. Consider:

A: If I make an assertion under what conditions will my assertion be incorrect?
B: Well, do you want to get things right from your perspective?
A: Sure.
B: Well then, don’t assert what is untrue from your perspective.

The result is that if B does not assert a proposition which is untrue relative to B’s perspective then A can evaluate B’s act by saying: relative to B’s perspective, B did not utter an untruth and so the norm of assertion has not been broken and so B did not do anything incorrect—again, relative to B’s perspective.
The final reading of the challenge alleges that the kind of response just given issues in a once-and-for-all assessment of correctness—and so relativism is ruled out. It is true that an assessment of the form ‘From the perspective of B, B did not do anything incorrect in making the assertion that they did’ is a once-and-for-all assessment in the sense that this evaluation is absolute—there is no assessment-sensitivity in the meta-language, the language we use to talk about the relativised correctness conditions of assertions. But that kind of once-and-for-all answer, unlike the answer ‘is correct (simpliciter)’, (i.e. ‘is correct with respect to all contexts of assessment’) is, of course, compatible with Truth-Relativism.​[27]​ So, there is no reading of Evans' challenge which troubles Truth-Relativism.


11.	Problem three: the incompleteness problem and the basic variability data.

While Kölbel (in his 2003) thinks that truth is one norm of assertion, he leaves it open that there may be further (stronger) norms in play. His account is incomplete (as he readily admits). However, this incompleteness is rather pressing if a Kölbel-style account is to account for the basic variability data.​[28]​ The template for this data, where speaker = assessor, and where, as before, c is a low-standards context and c' is a high-standards context, is:

(i) In context c, my assertion of ‘p’ seems to be legitimate.
(ii) In context c', my assertion of ‘p’ does not seem to be legitimate. 
(iii) My strength of epistemic position does not differ between c and c'.

Principles AT1 and AT2 entail, given datum (ii), that, in c', not-p. So, from the known unnassertibility of ‘my car is parked outside’, AT1 and AT2 entail that it is known that my car is not parked outside. But nobody thinks that is a datum.​[29]​ So, AT1 and AT2 need to be replaced.​[30]​


12.	Relativism and the knowledge norm for assertion: take one.

What is needed is something like a knowledge norm on assertion. A first version is:

(AK1) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct if and only if <s knows that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by c.

(where <p> is the proposition expressed by a use of S in c). Given data point (i) of the basic variability data, then from the left-to-right direction of AK1, it follows that, in c, I do know that my car is parked outside. Given data point (ii), then from the right-to-left direction of AK1, it follows that, in c', I do not know that my car is parked outside. Thus, the basic variability data, plus AK1, entails a shift in the truth-value of ‘s knows that p’ between c and c' despite no difference in strength of epistemic position.
We have used the right-to-left direction of AK1 in deriving a ‘shifty’ view from the basic variability data. That direction is more plausible than the right-to-left direction of either AT1 or AT2. Still, it has been doubted that knowledge is sufficient to warrant assertion. If that is right then it looks like a shifty view cannot be established from the variability data—there is no cogent argument against Invariantism using the data.​[31]​ But this is to underestimate the argumentative strategies at the disposal of a shifty view. One strategy (seen above) is to derive a shifty view directly from the variability data using the left-to-right direction of a principle like AK1.​[32]​ Another strategy is to provide a best explanation of the shifty data given a shifty theory and the left-to-right direction of AK1. The first strategy need only be employed with respect to the epistemic variability data. With a shifty view derived from that data we can then use the second strategy with respect to the basic variability data. Here the second data point tells us that it does not seem correct to assert the sentence ‘my car is parked outside’ in c'. This appearance can be explained given (a) ‘I do not know that my car is parked outside’ is already established as true relative to c' (given the first strategy) and (b) the left-to-right direction of AK1.​[33]​


13.	The basic re-evaluation data.

AK1, however, cannot account for the following ‘basic’ re-evaluation data:

(i) In context c, my assertion of the sentence ‘my car is parked outside’ seems to be legitimate.  
(ii) In context c', I re-evaluate this earlier assertion by saying: ‘It was incorrect to make that assertion’.
(iii) My strength of epistemic position does not differ between c and c'.

That should be no surprise as AK1, like AT1, are suited to Non-Indexical Contextualism rather than Truth-Relativism proper.


14.	Relativism and the knowledge norm for assertion: take two.

What is needed is:

(AK2) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if <s knows that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both c and a.

(where <p> is the proposition expressed by a use of S in c). Given data point (i) of the basic re-evaluation data, and the left-direction of AK1, then, relative to c, I know that my car is parked outside. Given data point (iii) from the epistemic re-evaluation data then, in context c', I (indirectly) re-evaluate my earlier assertion made in c by saying: ‘Indeed it would have been correct back then to assert that I did not know that my car is parked outside’. Given the left-to-right direction of AK2, using the first strategy mentioned above, it follows that, relative to c', I know that I do not know that my car is parked outside and so, given factivity, I do not know that my car is parked outside. This fact can then be used to best explain, using the left-to-right direction of AK2, why data point (ii) obtains for the basic re-evaluation data: it was incorrect, relative to c', to make the assertion, in c, that I know that my car is parked outside because, relative to c', I do not know that my car is parked outside. 





15.	MacFarlane on truth as the goal of assertion.

In response to Evans' challenge, MacFarlane (2003, pp. 333-4) says:

[…] at most Evans' challenge shows that a-contextuality [relativity to a perspective] is incompatible with a particular picture of assertion, on which assertion is like a game one can either win (by speaking the truth) or lose (by speaking falsely).

By extension, he is also committed to the view that a knowledge-account of assertion is ill-suited to make sense of assertion if truth is relative. But we have seen that an account based on either AT2 or AK2 can address the various readings of Evans' challenge. Furthermore, once we distinguish success-norms from aim-norms, we can see that the core content of a goal-based account of assertion is exhausted by principles like AT1, AT2, AK1, and AK2. A challenge then arises for MacFarlane: can the normative force of your own commitment based account of assertion be expressed in the form of a principle like AT2 or AK2? If it can then MacFarlane sponsors a goal-based account of assertion after all and so must address Evans' challenge as above.
As it turns out, MacFarlane has independent misgivings about goal-based accounts of assertion. He says:

It is not obvious that ‘aiming at the truth’ should play any part in an account of assertion. If we aim at anything in making assertions, it is to have an effect on people: to inform them, to persuade them, amuse them, encourage them, insult them, or (often enough) mislead them. Even if we limit ourselves to sincere assertions, truth is only our indirect aim: we aim to show others what we believe, and we aim to believe what is true. If we misrepresent our beliefs but hit the truth anyway (because our beliefs are false), we have failed to make a sincere assertion, while if we miss the truth but accurately represent our beliefs, we have succeeded in making one. Perhaps belief or judgment constitutively aims at truth; assertion does not (2003, p. 334).

But a sponsor of the idea that truth is the goal of assertion can agree with much of this since their account is, I take it, only concerned with a certain class of assertions: namely, those which are (a) sincere and (b) tied to the intrinsic role of assertion, namely the communication of information. The core claim of the goal-based account (given in terms of truth) is simply the insight that in sincerely asserting p (with the aim of communicating the information that p) one must speak truly (if one is to meet the success norm of assertion). If that is the core idea of the slogan that ‘truth is the aim of assertion’ then it is hard to see how MacFarlane’s (independent) misgivings have any bite. Likewise, it is hard to see how these misgivings carry over to the slogan ‘knowledge is the aim of assertion’. The core (success-based) idea behind this slogan is that in sincerely asserting p (with the aim of communicating the information that p) one must know that p is true (if one is to meet the success norm of assertion). 
	

16.	MacFarlane on assertion as commitment.

Because of his independent misgivings about any-goal based account, and because he thinks that such accounts cannot meet Evans' challenge, MacFarlane proposes what he takes to be an entirely different kind of account based on the basic insight that to assert to p is to commit to the truth of p, where, roughly, to commit to the truth of p involves being in a position to vindicate the truth of p if appropriately challenged and to give up this commitment if the challenge cannot be met. But what is it to vindicate the truth of p? He says:

I suggest that one is committed to producing a justification, that is, giving adequate reasons for thinking that the sentence is true (2003, p. 334).

The relativistic version of this commitment based view then runs as follows:

In asserting that p at a context cu, one commits oneself to providing adequate grounds for the truth of p (relative to cu and one’s current context of assessment), in response to any appropriate challenge. […] One can be released from this commitment only by withdrawing the assertion (2005a).

Here, one does not commit oneself to defend p relative to a context in which any challenge could be made but to a context in which such a challenge is deemed appropriate and is taken up by the asserter. Furthermore, in a low-standards context, my strength of epistemic position may be such that I can vindicate the truth of p, while in a high-standards context that same epistemic position may not be sufficient to provide such a vindication. 
	A further important feature of his view is revealed in the following: 

The norms constitutive of the practice of assertion […] do not include an obligation to withdraw an assertion one believes or knows to be false. Thus, one can lie without violating the constitutive norms of assertion (2003, p. 335, my italics). 

So, when one makes an insincere assertion (such as when one lies) one still undertake a commitment to defend the content asserted if challenged. (I will come back to this.)
	MacFarlane’s account suffers from four problems.


17.	Problem one: the over-intellectualisation challenge.

The first worry is that it is too demanding to require that an asserter be committed to vindicate the truth of the content asserted (when appropriately challenged) by being in a position to give reasons for thinking that p is true. Small children can make good and bad assertions (and so are subject to the norms of assertion) and yet we don’t always require of them that they be able to cite reasons in favour of the contents they assert.​[34]​
One way in which to address this worry is to have a very inclusive understanding as to what constitutes the citing of a reason.​[35]​ Suppose my assertion that the Battle of Waterloo took place in 1815 is challenged. While it may be that I am not able to cite any explicit evidence in favour of the proposition asserted—let’s say I have forgotten my sources—I may still be counted as meeting this challenge (in low-standards contexts at least) by saying: ‘I’m generally reliable about such things’ or even by saying ‘I’m pretty sure’. Indeed, it may be allowed that, under certain conditions, one can vindicate the truth of p simply by being disposed, when challenged, to re-assert the content that p (because such a disposition is grounded in the fact that it just seems to the asserter that p). So, a commitment account of assertion in terms of the asking and giving of reasons does not have to be intellectualist at all, contrary to initial appearances.


18.	Problem two: the account is a goal-based account after all.

Though MacFarlane does not do this, it looks like we can capture the normative force of a (relativistic) commitment based account via the following:

(M) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if s is in a position, in the context of assessment a, to defend this assertion (when appropriately challenged in a) by giving reasons to think that the proposition expressed by a use of S in c is true in the circumstances of evaluation determined by both c and a.

Note the structural similarity between AK2 and M. But if M captures the normative force of his account then the account is a goal-based account of assertion after all—for there is nothing more to a goal-based account than what is captured by such a biconditional. Assertion is like a game which one can win (by asserting p when one in a position to vindicate the truth of p) or lose (by asserting p when one is not in such a position). But then MacFarlane’s scruples against a goal-based account of assertion are without foundation—there is no sense in which his commitment based account of assertion is different (at least in respect of its normative force) than a goal-based account. Moreover, he must address Evans' challenge in the manner done so above.​[36]​  


19.	Problem three: there is no direct argument for Truth-Relativism about ‘knows’.

Is MacFarlanian account (based on something like M) equipped to provide a direct argument, via the data, in favour of Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’? Take the epistemic variability data, where as before: (iii) In context c, my assertion of the sentence ‘I know that p’ seems to be correct. (iv) In context c', my assertion of the sentence ‘I know that p’ does not seem to be correct. (v) In context c', my assertion of the sentence ‘I do not know that p’ seems to be correct. (vi) My strength of epistemic position in c does not differ from my strength of epistemic position in c'. Given (iii), a  MacFarlanian account entails, given the left-to-right direction of M, that I am in a position, in c, to vindicate the claim that I know that p. Given, (v), and the left-to-right direction of M, I am in a position, in c', to vindicate the claim that I do not know that p. However, this only entails that the sentence ‘I know that p’ shifts in truth-value between c and c' under the supposition that being in a position to vindicate the truth of p entails p. Recall, however, that MacFarlane thinks that one can make a warranted assertion even when one knows the asserted content to be false. Thus, being in a position to vindicate the truth of p is compatible with the falsity of p. In other words, there is no direct argument from the epistemic variability data, via M, to Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’. 
	There is such an argument using the basic variability data and M. It can be granted that, relative to a low-standards context c, I know that my car is parked outside. In a high-standards context c', the sentence ‘my car is parked outside’ is not assertible. Given the right-to-left direction of M, this entails that, relative to c', I am not in a position to vindicate the claim that my car is parked outside. If my knowledge that p entails that I am in a position to vindicate the truth of p, then it follows that, relative to c', I do not know that my car is parked outside. So, the basic data provides a direct argument in favour of Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’.
One immediate worry one might have with this argument is that the right-to-left direction of M, plus the thesis that knowing that p entails being in a position to vindicate the truth of p, entails the right-to-left direction of AK2. But is knowledge sufficient to warrant assertion? This might be questioned. For example, in a very-high standards context, where a great deal is at stake, one might doubt that knowledge is sufficient for assertion.​[37]​ So, MacFarlane has still some work to do if he is to show that Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’ follows from the data. 


20.	Problem four: the belief problem.

The variability data and re-evaluation data can be set up using token beliefs rather than assertions. The basic re-evaluation data for belief, where as before c is a low-standards context, is as follows: 

(i) In c, it seems correct to believe that my car is parked outside. 
(ii) In c', I raise the standards for myself by worrying about the presence of car thieves.
(iii) In c', it no longer seems correct for me to sustain the belief that my car is parked outside.
(iv) Indeed, in c', I judge that it was incorrect for me to form the belief that I did in c.
(v) My strength of epistemic position does not differ between c and c'. 

Can a commitment based model accommodate this data? It is a common view that belief is the inner correlate of assertion.​[38]​ On such a view, the norms governing belief are just the norms governing assertion. So, on such a view, there is no obstacle to specifying a version of M given in terms of beliefs rather than assertions.​[39]​ Such a doxastic version of M could then be used to account for the variability and re-evaluation data for beliefs. But the correlation of belief with assertion is problematic for MacFarlane because, as we have seen, MacFarlane allows that one can legitimately assert a proposition which one knows or believes to be false. However, it is surely not possible to legitimately believe a proposition which one knows or believes to be false.​[40]​ Hence, MacFarlane cannot transpose his commitment based account of assertion to a commitment based account of belief. The upshot is that he needs to offer an alternative set of norms to account for the data for beliefs—a natural choice would be a knowledge norm for belief (or some cognate norm). But now MacFarlane must offer a non-uniform account of all the data.​[41]​ 




21.	Truth-Relativism for token beliefs and the knowledge norm for belief. 

To make sense of a knowledge norm for token belief given Truth-Relativism, first consider a Kaplan-style clause for the truth-conditions of token beliefs (in what follows, by ‘belief’ I mean ‘token belief’):

(B) A belief that p, formed and held in a context of belief b, is true absolutely if and only if p is true relative to the circumstances of evaluation determined by the context of belief b.

Here the context of belief merely plays a circumstance-determinative role—it determines the world and the epistemic standards.​[43]​ B has its problems however. Suppose I believe in a low-standards context that I know that my car is parked outside. From a high-standards context, I later evaluate the content of my belief as false even though principle B forces me to evaluate the token belief itself as true absolutely. Thus, at least given Non-Indexical Contextualism as applied to beliefs, the following truth schema for belief fails: If a belief X has the content p, then X is true if and only if p.​[44]​ That is an unhappy consequence. This provides a reason to prefer Truth-Relativism over Non-Indexical Contextualism.
The relativistic version of B is:

(RB) A belief that p, formed and held in a context of belief b, is true, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if p is true relative to the circumstances of evaluation determined by the context of belief b and the context of assessment a.​[45]​

Here, the context of belief determines the world of evaluation, while the context of assessment fixes the epistemic standards.
The belief correlates of AK1 and AK2 are:

(BK1) A belief that p, formed and held by a subject s in context of belief b, is correct if and only if <s knows that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by b.

(BK2) A belief that p, formed and held by a subject s in context of belief b, is correct, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if <s knows that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both b and a.





22.	Truth-Relativism and alternative norms. 

For some, the knowledge norm of assertion is too strong.​[46]​ For others, it is too weak.​[47]​ For our purposes, we do not need to take sides here. The important point is that we can construct an argument to show that Truth-Relativism for ‘knows’ (of a certain kind) can be motivated via the data even if one rejects the knowledge norm for assertion.
	Suppose that an assertion that p by s is legitimate only if s is justified in believing that they know that p, where to be justified in believing that one knows that p, on this account, does not entail that one knows that p.​[48]​ Suppose one also thinks that being justified in believing that one knows is also sufficient to warrant assertion. A relativistic version of these two claims is:

(AJK) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in context of use c, is correct, relative to a context of assessment a, if and only if <s is justified in believing that they know that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both c and a.  

(where <p> is the proposition expressed by a use of S in c.) Here the standards in play at the context of assessment fix just what strength of epistemic position is sufficient for a subject to count as being justified in believing that they know that p.
Take the basic variability data. Relative to a low-standards context c, ‘I am justified in believing that I know that my car is parked outside’ is true. Indeed, relative to such a context, it also seems that ‘I know that I know that my car is parked outside’ is true. Relative to a high-standards context, it does not seem correct to assert ‘my car is parked outside’. Given the right-to-left direction of AJK, I am not justified in believing that I know that my car is parked outside, and so, given that knowledge requires being justified in believing, it follows that I do not know that I know that my car is parked outside. So, in the special case of second-order knowledge at least, ‘know’ is shifty. Invariantism is shown to be invalid even without the knowledge norm of assertion.
Suppose one doubts that it is a datum that, in c, ‘I know that I know that my car is parked outside’ is true (see below). Even so, it is a datum that ‘my car is parked outside’ is assertible, relative to c. Given the left-to right direction of AJK it follows that I am justified in believing that I know that my car is parked outside. This has the result that ‘being justified in believing that I know’ is shifty and so Invariantism for a certain kind of second-order justification is ruled out.
One might, alternatively, deny the right-to-left direction of AJK. If so, take the epistemic variability data. Relative to a high-standards context, the sentence ‘I do not know that my car is parked outside’ is assertible. Given the left-to-right direction of AJK, in that context, I am justified in believing that I know that I do not know that my car is parked outside, and so, via the closure of justification and the factivity of knowledge, I am justified in believing that I do not know that my car is parked outside. Thus, I am not justified in believing that I know that my car is parked outside. We have seen that, given the left-to-right direction of AJK, in a low-standards context, I am justified in believing that I know that my car is parked outside. So, ‘being justified in believing that I know’ is shifty. Likewise, if it is a datum that, in a low-standards context, I know that I know that my car is parked outside, then ‘knowing that I know’ is shifty. Invariantism, of the classical variety, is thus ruled out even if one denies both directions of AK2 and accepts the left-to-right direction of AJK (plus the epistemic variability data).​[49]​, ​[50]​ 
The problem proliferates. Whatever plausible norm of assertion is proposed, it always seems possible to find some variability data which supports some shifty view or other. For example, Stanley (2008) has argued for an epistemic certainty norm for assertion whereby:

(AC) An assertion of the sentence S, by s in a context c, is legitimate only if s’s strength of epistemic position with respect to <p> is such that the sentence ‘it is epistemically certain that p’, as used in c, is true (where <p> is the proposition expressed by the use of S in c).​[51]​

For Stanley, one is epistemically certain that p just in case ‘one knows that p on the basis of evidence that gives one the highest degree of justification for one’s belief that p’. Furthermore, Stanley holds that while ‘it is epistemically certain that p’ is context-sensitive, ‘knows’ is not:  

[…] one can agree with DeRose that there are contextually varying standards for assertion, while rejecting contextualism about knowledge attributions. Since the norms for assertion involve certainty, and certainty is also a context-dependent matter, the fact that there are varying contextual standards for assertion is consistent with invariantism about knowledge (Stanley 2008).

This can’t be right. Take the epistemic variability data, whereby ‘I know that my car is parked outside’, as used in a low-standards context c, is assertible and indeed true, and where ‘I do not know that my car is parked outside’, as used in a high-standards context c', is assertible. Given AC, it follows that ‘it is epistemically certain that I do not know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is true. Given that epistemic certainty entails knowledge then it follows that ‘it is known that I do not know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is true. Given the factivity of knowledge it follows that ‘I do not know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is true, and so the sentence ‘I do know that my car is parked outside’, as used in c', is false. Since there is no difference in the strength of epistemic position of either subject or speaker or assessor between c and c' but merely a difference in the epistemic standards that obtain between these two contexts of utterance, then contextualism (or relativism) about ‘knows’ follows from the data plus the certainty norm on assertion. If Stanley wants to have a coherent view he must give something up.





Let Generic Norm-Relativism be the view that what norm of assertion is in play in some context of use is itself relative to a perspective. Relative to a low-standards context of assessment, the norm in play in some context of use will be some fairly undemanding norm. Relative to a high-standards context of assessment, the norm will be some more demanding norm. This is an initially attractive view, one which is prima facie more attractive than holding that ‘knows’ is semantically context-sensitive or assessment-sensitive. The basic idea behind it is that the standards for assertibility are demanding in certain contexts (e.g. in legal contexts) but less demanding in other contexts (e.g. the pub).​[52]​ There are various ways in which this idea might be developed.
One way to do so is to draw a (simplistic) distinction between weak, normal, and strong epistemic positions. Recall that, on a shifty view of ‘knows’, the epistemic standards fix just what strength of epistemic position is required for a subject to count as knowing. On such a view, while the ‘knowledge-bar’ goes up and down as a function of just what the epistemic standards are (in the context of use and/or context of assessment), the subject’s strength of epistemic position does not. So, whether or not one is in a weak, or normal, or strong epistemic position does not shift as a function of shifting epistemic standards. We can exploit this fact in setting forth a generic version of Norm-Relativism. When one is in a weak epistemic position then ‘my car is parked outside’ is not assertible—no matter how low the epistemic standards are. When the epistemic standards are high then only when the asserter is in a strong epistemic is the assertion of ‘my car is parked outside’ legitimate. When the epistemic standards are low then either a normal or a high strength of epistemic position warrants the assertion of ‘my car is parked outside’. 
So, we have:

(LOW1) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a low-standards context of assessment, if and only if s is in a normal or strong epistemic position (with respect to the proposition expressed by a use of S in c).

(HIGH1) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a high-standards context of assessment, if and only if s is in a strong epistemic position (with respect to the proposition expressed by a use of S in c).

Take the basic variability data. Relative to a low-standards assessment context a, it is legitimate for me to assert ‘my car is parked outside’. Given the left-to-right direction of LOW1, then I am in either a normal or a strong epistemic position (with respect to the proposition concerned—I will omit this qualification in what follows). Relative to a high-standards assessment context a', it is not legitimate for me to assert ‘my car is parked outside’. Given the right-to-left direction of HIGH1 then I am not in a strong epistemic position. It is furthermore taken for granted that there is no change in the epistemic position of the subject (who in this case is also the subject and the asserter) between c and c'. So, if I am not in a strong epistemic position in both c and c' then I am in normal epistemic position in both c and c'. On this generic (and simplistic) version of Norm-Relativism, then, there is a change in assertibility of ‘my car is parked outside’ across two contexts (of assessment) without there being a change in my epistemic position. In other words, generic Norm-Relativism, as it stands, neither entails that ‘is in a weak/normal/strong epistemic position’ is shifty nor entails that ‘know’ is shifty. Generic Norm-Relativism is thus a form of Invariantism for ‘knows’, moreover a form of Invariantism which takes the variability and re-evaluation data at face value.​[53]​
	One worry with Norm-Relativism is that we seem to lack an independent grip on what it is to be in a weak, normal, or strong epistemic position. This worry has an answer: we use intuitions about assertibility (relative to both low and high-standards) to illuminate the difference between weak, normal, and strong epistemic positions—rather than the other way around. Still, it would be more theoretically satisfying if the norms could be stated in more familiar terms, i.e. in terms of justification and knowledge. 


24.	A specific form of Norm-Relativism.

As it turns out, it is not easy to find a specific version of Norm-Relativism which does not entail that ‘knows’ is shifty. One promising, but again simplistic, candidate holds that justification warrants assertion, relative to a low-standards context of assessment, but that knowledge warrants assertion relative to a high-standards context of assessment. This yields:

(LOW2) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a low-standards context of assessment, if and only if s is justified in believing that p, (where <p> is the proposition expressed by the use of S in c).

(HIGH2) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a high-standards context of assessment, if and only if s knows that p, (where <p> is the proposition expressed by the use of S in c).

(Here let the notion of justification be such that one is justified in believing that p just in case p is highly probable on one’s evidence.)
Alternatively, one could endorse LOW2 and: 
  
(HIGH3) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a high-standards context of assessment, if and only if s is justified in believing that they know that p, (where <p> is the proposition expressed by the use of S in c).

The advantage of HIGH3 over HIGH2 is that the former norm can explain why an assertion of the sentence ‘p but I am not justified in believing that I know that p’ is illegitimate.​[54]​ Indeed, HIGH3 is well placed to explain the oddity of asserting ‘p but I do not know that p’.​[55]​
	The problem with LOW2 is that it still seems illegitimate to assert ‘p and I do not know that p’ even relative to a low-standards context of assessment. But since only a justification norm for assertion holds relative to such a low-standards context then there is no route to explain the oddity of asserting this particular sentence. There are two replies.
The first is to maintain that, when standards are low at least, it is not, after all, odd to assert certain instances of this sentence. Take the case of weather forecasting. Suppose I say: ‘Six feet of snow will not fall in Alice Springs tomorrow’. You reply: ‘Do you know that will not happen?’. I reply: ‘No I don’t know it will not happen. But, to repeat: six feet of snow will not fall in Alice Springs tomorrow’. That doesn’t seem so odd because, on the one hand, we do make assertions involving future contingents all the time.​[56]​ On the other hand, if the future is genuinely open there is some non-zero objective probability that six feet of snow will fall in Alice Springs tomorrow—there is always some objective risk of something odd happening which precludes knowing (even though it remains highly probable on my evidence that six feet of snow will not fall in Alice Springs tomorrow).​[57]​ So, we can simultaneously grant that assertions involving future contingents are legitimate even though we do not know that what is asserted is true. The trouble with this proposal is that it may only be workable for the limited case of future contingents.
A better reply is to grant that an assertion of ‘p but I do not know that p’ cannot be legitimately asserted but that this does not lend any weight to the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion absolutely, i.e., relative to all contexts of assessment. Go back to the dialogue above. When confronted with the aggressive challenge ‘Do you know that it will not happen?’, the standards (for assertibility) get raised because such a question gets the asserter to explicitly consider the epistemic pedigree of their evidence. Likewise, when I assert ‘p but I do not know that p’, the assertion of the second conjunct acts as an explicit evaluation of one’s evidential position with respect to p. In other words, the very act of uttering the sentence ‘p but I do not know that p’ automatically ensures that the standards are raised. So, on our simplistic model, LOW2 is no longer in play, but rather HIGH2 or HIGH3. But once HIGH2 or HIGH3 is in play, the oddity of asserting ‘p but I do not know that p’ can be explained.​[58]​
Lots more could be said about the various directions in which one could develop such a view. Rather than do that, I want to record one serious worry with Norm-Relativism—in whatever form it takes. Take the basic variability data given in terms of belief. Relative to a low-standards context of assessment, it is legitimate to believe that my car is parked outside. However, relative to a high-standards context, it is not legitimate to believe that my car is parked outside. However, it is surely plausible that if a subject knows that their car is parked outside then it is legitimate for them to believe that their car is parked outside.​[59]​ But then it follows that, relative to a high-standards context, I do not know that my car is parked outside. Since, plausibly, relative to a low-standards context, I do know that my car is parked outside, and since there is no change in the epistemic position of the believer or assessor across these contexts of assessment, then Norm-Relativism entails a shifty view of ‘knows’ after all. 
There seem to be (at least) three possible replies:

Reply One: Bite the bullet and allow that Norm-Relativism is, after all, incompatible with Invariantism. On this response, however, Norm-Relativism is an eccentric view since the whole purpose of introducing the idea of different norms of assertion for different (assessment) contexts is to avoid any commitment to the idea that ‘s knows that p’ can shift in truth-value across contexts (of assessment).

Reply Two: Deny that belief is the inner correlate of assertion such that while the standards for legitimate assertion are assessment-sensitive, the standards for legitimate belief are not. Here the idea would be that there is an assessment-insensitive norm for belief, but something like LOW2 and HIGH2/HIGH3 for assertion. It is somewhat plausible that the standards for correct belief are lower than the standards for correct assertion such that there is indeed a disanalogy between belief and assertion.​[60]​ That claim is compatible with Norm-Relativism for belief. However, it surely entirely both ad hoc and implausible to claim that the disanalogy runs much deeper. The variability data for belief is just as compelling as the variability data for assertion. 

Reply Three: One way to stabilise the view in hand is to reject HIGH2 in favour of HIGH3 or even something like:

(HIGH4) An assertion of a sentence S, by a subject s in a context of use c, is correct, relative to a high-standards context of assessment, if and only if s knows that they know that p, (where <p> is the proposition expressed by the use of S in c).






We have seen that Kölbel’s account of assertion is unable to make sense of either the epistemic variability data nor any kind of re-evaluation data for assertion. MacFarlane’s commitment-based account is better placed on this score. However, such a view can only account for the variability and re-evaluation data for belief by effectively collapsing into a knowledge account of the norms for assertion and belief based on (something like) the principles AK2 and BK2. Hence, MacFarlane is far too hasty to reject a goal-based account of assertion. Finally, if Truth-Relativism is to be at all plausible then Norm-Relativism had firstly better be ruled out. However, it seems as if Norm-Relativism remains a distinctly live option. Indeed, Norm-Relativism is surely far more attractive than Truth-Relativism since it requires no modification of standard semantics to the effect that both propositional truth and utterance truth is relative to a perspective. For that reason, if one takes all the data adduced above seriously, then Norm-Relativism has a distinct edge over Truth-Relativism.
One final and as yet unexplored issue remains. Some philosophers have a drawn a connection between knowing p and being able to (legitimately) use p as a premise in some practical reasoning.​[62]​ Whether or not it is legitimate to use p in a premise in some practical reasoning is, arguably, also an assessment-sensitive matter. Given Truth-Relativism, the kind of practical norm needed to make sense of this idea would be:

(PK) It is legitimate, relative to a context of assessment a, for a subject s to use p as a premise in some practical reasoning, (i.e. act on p), in some context of action ca, if and only if <s knows that p> is true at the circumstances of evaluation determined by both ca and a.

(here the context of action ca fixes the world of evaluation, while the context of assessment a fixes the epistemic standards). The thought is that whether or not it is legitimate to act on p in some context of action need not depend on the (epistemic) standards that obtain for the agent at that context of action, but may rather depend on the standards that obtain for some assessor.
	Consider the following data: Jones parks his car outside as usual after work. When he wakes up in the morning he performs the following reasoning: ‘my car is parked outside, so I can use it to drive to work rather than walk. Since I will drive to work then I can lie in bed for another ten minutes’. Given this reasoning, Jones lies in bed for another ten minutes. Call this laying-a-bed his (token) action on p, where <p> is the proposition that Jones’s car is parked outside.
The basic re-evaluation data for this token action on p is as follows: Relative to a low-standards context, Jones’s token action on p seems to be perfectly legitimate. Relative to a high-standards context, however, I evaluate his token action on p as illegitimate. That is, I say: ‘He was wrong to stay in bed for another ten minutes’. As before, there is no change in my epistemic position. Nor is there any change in the epistemic position, nor the standards or stakes, for Jones himself.​[63]​ What can best explain the fact that a token action is legitimate from one perspective but illegitimate from another? Enter PK plus the claim—which has been independently established from the variability data and re-evaluation data with respect to assertion and belief—that while I know that my car is parked outside, relative to a low-standards context, I do not know that p relative to a high-standards context. If we take the re-evaluation data for acting on p seriously then Truth-Relativism is well placed to explain this data—but only so far as one accepts a principle like PK. We have thus found a further fruitful application for Truth-Relativism.
With respect to Norm-Relativism, the norms of practical reasoning would be (something like):

(PLOW) It is legitimate, relative to a low-standards context of assessment, for a subject s to use p as a premise in some practical reasoning (i.e. act on p) if and only if s is justified in believing that p.

(PHIGH) It is legitimate, relative to a high-standards context of assessment, for a subject s to use p as a premise in some practical reasoning (i.e. act on p) if and only if s is justified in believing that they know that p. 
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^1	  For applications of Truth-Relativism: to predicates of personal taste, see Kölbel (2002, 2003), Lasersohn (2005), MacFarlane (2007a); to future contingents, see MacFarlane (2003, 2008); to epistemic modals, see Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2007), MacFarlane (2009); to vagueness, see Richard (2004); to epistemic locutions, see Richard (2004), MacFarlane (2005a). Truth-Relativism should be contrasted with Content-Relativism—the view that what is said by an utterance of a sentence type can be relative to a perspective (cf. Egan 2008, Cappelen 2008).
^2	  See Dummett (1959), Williams (1973), and Weiner (2005). In what follows, in place of ‘correct’ I will sometimes use ‘legitimate’ or ‘warranted’. It is a further and vexed question as to what is meant by these locutions. We can certainly discern an objective sense of correctness and a subjective sense with respect to reasons for action: given that I am thirsty, it may be subjectively correct for me to drink the watery looking stuff in my glass, but objectively incorrect for me to drink it because it is poisoned. Likewise, if I am a bodiless brain in a vat, it may be subjectively correct for me assert/believe that I have a body but objectively incorrect to do so. Given the focus on the truth and knowledge norms in what follows, we will mainly be concerned with objective correctness.
^3	  See Williamson (2000, ch. 11).
^4	  Evans' challenge is revived in MacFarlane (2003); cf. Percival (1994). 
^5	  Kölbel expresses this principle in terms of belief, but it is clear he takes it to apply to assertions also.
^6	  Cf. Brandom (1983, 1994).
^7	  Egan (2007b) develops a relativistic conception of assertion from within a broadly Stalnakerian model of assertion (see Stalnaker 1978). Since such a model of assertion does not bear directly on the data adduced in favour of relativism for ‘knows’, I will not consider it.
^8	  Cf. Kaplan (1989, p. 522); cf. Lewis (1980). 
^9	  MacFarlane (2008) usefully calls these the ‘content-determinative role’ and the ‘circumstance-determinative role’, respectively.
^10	  Either what Cappelen and LePore (2005, p. 8) call a ‘surprise indexical’ (and so semantically akin to ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘that’) or what these authors call a ‘hidden indexical’ (and so semantically akin to ‘is short’ where, on many conceptions at least, the logical form of this predicate is of the order is short for an X, where X gets filled by a value fixed by the context of use).
^11	  See Cohen (1986), (1988); DeRose (1992), (1995), (2002); Lewis (1996).
^12	  Non-Indexical Contextualism for ‘knows’ has been defended by Kompa (2002) and Brogaard (2008). As MacFarlane (2007b) notes, the view is an analogue of Temporalism. Cf. Recanati (2008).
^13	  MacFarlane (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b).
^14	  This form of Truth-Relativism is most notably defended by MacFarlane; cf. Lasersohn (2005). It is unclear whether Richard (2004) and Kölbel (2002, 2003) defend Non-Indexical Contextualism or Truth-Relativism. 
^15	  Further standard cases include the ‘Bank Case’ (DeRose 1992), the ‘Airport Case’ (Cohen 1998), and sceptical cases (DeRose 1995). 
^16	  This just means that one’s evidential position does not change between c and c' (the terminology is, of course, due to DeRose 1995). 
^17	  Cf. Cohen (1998).
^18	  Nor do such cases support the kind of subject-sensitive Invariantism sponsored by Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005).
^19	  See Williamson (2009) for relevant discussion.
^20	  See DeRose (1996).
^21	  A healthy dose of externalism leads the way here.
^22	  See e.g. Dummett (1959): ‘it is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements’. Cf. Williams (1973).
^23	  This was suggested to me by Declan Smithies.
^24	  Putting aside the general problem of saying in what correctness consists; see fn. 2.
^25	  These data points in fact just record that certain assertions seem to be correct/incorrect. One must also assume that these appearances are veridical in order to exploit the data properly. That is quite an assumption of course, but not one I will dispute here.
^26	  This re-evaluation data differs from what MacFarlane (2009) calls ‘retraction’ data: ‘It is important to distinguish retracting an assertion from claiming that one ought not to have made it in the first place. To say that one was wrong in claiming that p is not to say that one was wrong to claim that p.’ One can re-evaluate an assertion that p, i.e. claim that one ought not to have asserted p in the first place, (i.e., in MacFarlane’s terminology, say that one was wrong in claiming that p), without retracting that assertion, (i.e. say that one was wrong to claim that p), because one may have good evidence for asserting p now, but also see that one’s previous evidence for p was insufficient to legitimately make the original assertion. It seems to me that one can motivate Truth-Relativism via the re-evaluation data more directly than one can motivate it via MacFarlane’s retraction data, so I will ignore retraction in what follows.
^27	  Cf. Wright and Moruzzi (2008).
^28	  As it turns out, in his (2009), Kölbel accepts both directions of a (relativistic) truth norm on assertion. As a consequence he cannot make sense of the basic variability data if he wants to give a relativistic account of ‘knows’.
^29	  Cf. DeRose (2002) on what he calls ‘the generality problem’. 
^30	  One might try to save a truth account of assertion by invoking some kind of secondary norm to the effect that one’s assertion is (secondarily) correct only if one is justified in believing that one is satisfying the primary (truth) norm (see Weiner 2005 for this general type of account). The idea here would be that the secondary norm can be invoked to explain the basic variability data. Such a gambit is highly suspicious. If assertion is simultaneously governed by such primary and secondary norms then assertion is simply governed by a more general norm which says: s’s assertion that p is correct only if p is true and s is justified in believing p. Moreover, if we are to make sense of all the epistemic and basic variability data then the secondary norm will need to be: an assertion that p is correct only if one knows that one is satisfying the primary (truth) norm with respect to p. But then the more general norm in this case will just be the knowledge norm, and so nothing is gained by the gambit in hand.
^31	  This claim is made by Brown (2008).
^32	  This is the broad strategy of DeRose (2002).
^33	  Brown (2008) also alleges that the left-to-right direction of AK1 is suspect such that there is no argument against Invariantism using the variability data. See below where I show that there is such an argument given other principles accepted by Brown.
^34	  MacFarlane is aware of this problem when he raises the worry that perhaps his account over-generalises from seminar-room assertions to assertions in general (see MacFarlane 2005a, 2005b). He suggests that the following weaker norm will suffice for his purposes: if an assertion has been shown to be untrue (relative to a context of use and a context of assessment a) then one must, in a, withdraw it (see 2005a, fn.36). However, this norm cannot explain the basic re-evaluation data.
^35	  Cf. Brandom (1998). 
^36	  A commitment based account per se may indeed only specify what one is committing oneself to in making an assertion (thanks to John MacFarlane for impressing this point upon me). But if that is so then it is hard to see how such an account can exploit the linguistic data in favour of relativism for ‘knows’. If one adds something like the assumption that an assertion is incorrect if and only if one cannot discharge the commitments occurred in making that assertion (an assumption which seems to be tacit in MacFarlane 2005a) then one has an account of the right kind of shape to derive a shifty view of ‘knows’ from the data—but such a richer commitment-based account (for the truth-relativist) will surely have to involve something very like M. 
^37	  See e.g. Brown (2008).
^38	  See e.g. Brandom (1994), Williamson (2000, pp. 255-6). Strictly speaking, judgment is the inner correlate of assertion, where the act of judging that p brings about the state of believing that p. 
^39	  In fact the correlation between belief/judgment and assertion is somewhat more complicated. For simplicity, in what follows, I will assume that they are (normatively) on a par. 
^40	  I am not saying that it is not possible to form a belief that p when one knows that not-p. Rather, that one cannot legitimately do so. Cf. Williams (1973).
^41	  MacFarlane is somewhat prepared to concede that ‘we aim to believe what is true’ (2003, p. 334), though it is not clear whether he is alluding to what I termed the aim norm here or the success norm (or both).
^42	  If being in a position to vindicate the truth of p is a factive state which falls short of knowledge (e.g. something like a factive notion of ‘warrant’, where having a warranted belief falls short of knowledge) then this simply means that M collapses into a warrant-correlate of AK2, where this correlate is doing all the explanatory work. Equally, one could adopt a justificationist correlate of AK2, where to be justified in believing p is a non-factive state. This would still forbid one from asserting/believing propositions which one knows or believes to be false but would allow one to legitimately assert/believe propositions which are false. 
^43	  Controversially, I am assuming a conception of belief and content whereby the contents of beliefs, when fully specified, do not contain indexical elements.
^44	  It is often said that utterance truth is a technical notion (see e.g. MacFarlane 2008, p. 94) such that there is no pre-theoretical, everyday, intuition which favours a disquotional schema for utterance truth. We do however speak of token beliefs as being true or false in an everyday sense. So, arguably, there is a strong pre-theoretical intuition in favour of the belief truth-schema. Bad news for Non-Indexical Contextualism.    
^45	  There is an analogous principle for judgment.
^46	  Lackey (2007), Weiner (2005), Kvanvig (2009).
^47	  Stanley (2008) proposes a certainty norm for assertion (see below).
^48	  Cf. Kvanvig (2009); see also Smithies, forthcoming.  
^49	  Brown (2008) rejects both directions of AK2 in order to defend Invariantism. However, she is also sympathetic to the left-to-right direction of a norm cognate to AJK. Given the data just sketched, that is an inconsistent position.
^50	  Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (of the form defended by Hawthorne 2004 and Stanley 2005) would seem to be compatible with AJK and the data.
^51	  This is an extrapolation of Stanley’s view.
^52	  In effect, Norm-Relativism delivers one form of a WAM, where a WAM ‘consists of an attempt to explain some intuitions about correctness or incorrectness of applying a term, or making an assertion, by arguing that the conditions reflect warranted-assertibility conditions rather than truth-conditions’ (Brown 1995, p. 265). However, those who have offered WAM type strategies in the literature have typically also assumed that there is a single norm of assertion which holds in all contexts. The arguments in the previous section ought to show that such a position is not workable if one takes the data seriously. One needs to posit that the norm of assertion is itself sensitive to the context (of assessment). On this score, it is perhaps useful to distinguish assertibility values (e.g. ‘is assertible’, ‘is not assertible’) from assertibility conditions (cf. truth-values versus truth-conditions). One kind of WAM, the kind one typically finds in the literature, simply says that the assertibility-values of ‘S knows that p’ come apart from the truth-values of utterances of ‘S knows that p’—specifically that the former vary with context while the latter do not. Another (and better) kind of WAM says something stronger: the very conditions under which it is correct to make an assertion that p (i.e. the norm of assertion) come apart from the conditions under which p is true/known—specifically the former vary with context while the latter do not. In other words, in different contexts, assertibility is tied to different norms. That provides a much richer (and more stable) framework in which to combat a shifty view of ‘knows’.
^53	  A related proposal is to hold that there is one basic (primary) norm of assertion which holds in all contexts (of assessment), but that the standards affect just what kind of secondary norm is in play (though see fn. 29 for misgivings concerning secondary norms).
^54	  If the combination of LOW2 and HIGH3 is to sustain a form of Invariantism then it had better not be a datum that, relative to a low-standards context of assessment, a subject is justified in believing that they know that p (see below).
^55	  Suppose that my assertion of ‘p but I do not know that p’ is legitimate and so an assertion of each conjunct is likewise legitimate. Given HIGH3, and the assertibility of the second conjunct, then I am justified in believing that I know that I do not know that p. Given the closure of justification, and the factivity of knowledge, it follows that I am justified in believing that I do not know that p. Given HIGH3, and the assertibility of first conjunct, then I am justified in believing that I know that p. However, one cannot both be justified in believing that p and justified in believing that not-p. So, it is not legitimate to assert ‘p but I do not know that p’.
^56	  Weiner (2005) thinks that the knowledge norm fails for retrodictions (claims about the past) as well as predictions (claims about the future). There is not space to assess this position here.
^57	  Especially if (i) the fact that there is some non-zero objective probability of not-p entails that there is a close possible world in which not​-p, and (ii) to know that p requires that it is not an easy possibility that not-p. Williamson (2009) denies (i).
^58	  A similar objection to the view in hand, put to me by Jonathan Schaffer, is that it cannot make sense of the so-called challenge data (see Williamson 1996, 2000, ch.11). Here the thought is that it seems natural in all contexts when challenging an assertion to challenge that assertion by saying: ‘Do you know that?’. But if that is so, it looks like the knowledge norm holds in all contexts. The reply, which is analogous to the one given in the text as regards the Moorean data, has to be that such challenges, by their very aggressive nature, function to raise the standards making it seem like the knowledge norm is operative in all contexts.
^59	  This should remain plausible even if, like Brown (2008), one denies the right-to-left direction of AK1 or AK2.
^60	  Here the idea is that in believing that p only a single subject is relying on p in their practical deliberations. However, in asserting that p, one aims to get others to rely on p too.
^61	  This does have the effect of making certain second-order epistemic states elusive: in attributing those states to subjects from a low-standards perspective, we thereby raise the standards in that very context of assessment, but in so doing we can longer legitimately and stably attribute those states to the subject (cf. Lewis (1996) on the elusiveness of first-order knowledge). 
^62	  E.g. Williamson (2005), Hawthorne and Stanley (forthcoming).
^63	  Hence, a subject-centred view whereby the standards and/or stakes are tied to the subject (see e.g. Hawthorne and Stanley, forthcoming) cannot account for the re-evaluation data for practical reasoning.
^64	  An early version of this paper was presented at the Bled Epistemology conference in June 2007. Later versions were presented at ANU, January 2009, the University of Sydney, January 2009, The Institute for Philosophy at the University of London, February 2009, the Arché Contextualism and Relativism Seminar, May 2009, and the Winter School, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, July 2009. Thanks to those present for helpful feedback, and particularly to: David Chalmers, Tim Crane, Tama Coutts, Dylan Dodd, Jonathan Ichikawa, Michael Lynch, David Macarthur, Huw Price, Brian Rabern, Sven Rosenkranz, Jonathan Schaffer, Kevin Scharp, Susanna Schellenberg, Wolfgang Schwartz, Lionel Shapiro, Barry Smith, Declan Smithies, Daniel Stoljar, Paula Sweeney, and Mike Titelbaum. I also had very useful written feedback from the referees, and from Paul Dimmock, Brian Kim, John MacFarlane, Aidan McGlynn, and Declan Smithies. Particular thanks go to the editors Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen. §6 is extracted from a talk I gave at St. Andrews (October 2004), UConn (February 2005), and Brown (February 2005), entitled ‘Is Life a Lottery?’ Thanks to the audiences at those three talks and particularly to JC Beall, Mike Lynch and Ernest Sosa. This paper was written while I was a visiting research fellow in the ARC funded Pragmatic Foundations of Language Project, at the Centre For Time, University of Sydney.
